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Abstract 
 
In this paper the educational background of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of Large U.S. 
Firms are examined.  Specifically, the educational background of CEOs from large U.S. firms, as 
identified in the Forbes 800 Compensation List, are examined.  Information concerning the 
number of Chief Executive Officers that received their undergraduate and graduate degrees from 
463 institutes of higher education are compiled.   We find that most CEOs have an undergraduate 
degree, while about half possess a graduate degree.  The results indicate that there are preferred 
educational backgrounds for selection as the CEO of a major corporation.  We also examine how 
the educational background of the CEO is related to the CEO’s total compensation.  The evidence 
indicates that those CEOs that do not have a degree earn significantly more than those CEO’s 
that do have a college degree.  We find little evidence that the school attended affects the 
compensation that the CEO receives.  Finally, we examine firm ROA and Tobin’s Q based on the 
educational background of the CEO.  We find an association between possession of a degree as 
well as where the degree was earned and the ROA and Tobin’s Q of the firm.   
 
 
Section 1 Introduction 
 
xecutive Compensation has long been an area of interest in the finance literature.  Of particular interest is 
how compensation is related to executive motivation, performance, perks and other variables.  In this paper 
the educational paths that individuals take on their way to becoming the chief executive officer (CEO) of 
large U.S. firms are examined. The CEO’s total compensation is then related to the institution that the executive 
received his/her degree(s) from.  The results indicate that there is a high probability that the CEO for a large 
company received his/her undergraduate, graduate, or both degrees from a select group of higher education 
institutions.  We find significant differences in CEO total compensation based on having earned an undergraduate 
and graduate degree as well as where the degree was earned from.  We find CEO compensation differences based on 
the number of years the individual has been with the firm, the years the individual has been the firm’s CEO, the age 
of the CEO, if the CEO is the founder of the firm and on the size of the firm.  We find that possessing an 
undergraduate degree as well as a graduate degree has explanatory power for the ROA and Tobin’s Q of the firm.  
We also find evidence that the class of school attended explains the firms ROA and Tobin’s Q.  The remainder of 
the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, the data is discussed, in Section 3 the results of the empirical 
analysis are presented.  Finally, Section 4 contains concluding comments. 
 
Section 2 The Data 
 
Each year since 1973, Forbes magazine has published a list containing information about the CEO’s of 
large United States Companies.  Specifically, Forbes Magazine examines compensation for approximately 800 
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
Chief Executive Officers each year.  The 800 CEOs included in the list each year are identified from the Forbes 500 
E 
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lists of largest companies ranked by sales, profits, assets and stock market value.  A company that makes any of the 
Forbes 500 lists is included in the Forbes 800 Compensation List.  This Forbes 800 Compensation List contains 
background information about each firms CEO, the compensation of the CEO, as well as firm performance data.  
The Forbes 800 Compensation List is the foundation for this study.  The most recent 5 years of Forbes data was 
obtained in electronic format from Forbes Magazine.  Data prior to 1992 was no longer available from Forbes 
Magazine.  In order to complete the dataset the Forbes 800 Compensation List was recreated in electronic format 
from hard copies of the magazine for years prior to 1992.  The combined dataset contains 20,884 annual 
observations spanning from 1972 through 1996 (published in years 1973-1997).  The variables contained in the 
dataset vary by year.  Individual years contain as many as 30 variables.  Since the 1988 publication, Forbes has 
included variables in their dataset indicating the University where the CEO received his/her undergraduate and 
graduate degrees.  Of interest in this study is to examine these education variables.  As such Forbes data covering 
the calendar years 1987 through 1996 are used in this study.  This data contains 8000 annual observations.  It is 
important to emphasize that this study examines only those executives that hold the position of CEO in the firm.  
The CEO is not the only executive officer within the firm and is not necessarily the highest compensated executive 
within the firm as is pointed out in a cover article for the Forbes 800 Compensation List (Byrne 1985). 
 
In order to facilitate additional tests, each firm in the Forbes 800 Compensation List was matched with its 
corresponding CUSIP number.  Once matched with its Cusip number data from Compustat was obtained.  Annual 
data for the Compustat variables: industry (Compustat Variable Dnum) and total assets (Compustat Annual Variable 
6) of the firm were obtained.  When Compustat data was not available for a company, the observation was 
eliminated from the dataset.  
 
Section 3  Analysis 
 
In this section we report the results of the empirical examination.  The results are divided into two sections.  
In Section 3.1, the effectiveness of various universities in placing their graduates in CEO positions is examined.  In 
section 3.2, the extent that educational background effects CEO total compensation is examined. 
  
3.1 University Effectiveness 
 
The first step in the analysis is to examine the number of management years that were performed by 
individuals possessing a degree versus those that did not possess a degree.  For the analysis each annual observation 
in the dataset is considered a management year.    Of the 8000 observations in the dataset, 7335 (91.7 percent) 
observations were performed by CEOs having an undergraduate degree while 665 (8.3 percent) observations were 
performed by CEOs that did not have an undergraduate degree.  The evidence leaves little doubt about the 
importance of an undergraduate degree in achieving the CEO level of career development.    Of the 8000 
observations, 3930 (49.1 %) observations were performed by CEOs having a graduate degree while 4070 (50.9 %) 
of the observations were performed by CEOs that did not have a graduate degree.  Thus while having an 
undergraduate degree is quite important in becoming a CEO, having a graduate degree appears to be somewhat less 
critical.  The importance of having an undergraduate and graduate degree is examined in more detail later in the 
paper. 
 
One method of measuring the effectiveness of a University is by examining the placement record of its 
graduates.  A number of organizations rank universities on various attributes.  The U.S. News and World Report 
(USNWR) produces one of the most prominent rankings.  USNWR provides an annual overall ranking of 
universities on a nationwide basis.  The rankings are based on surveys completed by the institutions.  USNWR 
provides separate rankings of schools based on their mission as a national or regional university.  Both 
undergraduate and graduate programs are ranked.  In addition, rankings by academic disciplines are provided.  
Schools are ranked based on sixteen indicators of academic excellence.  These criteria fall into the categories of 
academic reputation, retention, faculty resources, student selectivity, financial resources, graduation rate and alumni 
giving.  Business Week publishes an annual ranking of 225 graduate schools of business.    Like the UNWR, 
Business Week develops its ranking based on surveys.  Business Week surveys recruiters and students and 
aggregates the data into a ranking system.  Business week provides an overall ranking as well as a ranking by each 
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of several criteria.  These criteria include enrollment, acceptance rates, program costs, job placement, starting salary 
information and others.  The Wall Street Journal ranks over 300 graduate schools of business based on twenty-seven 
criteria annually.  It aggregates the criteria into an overall ranking.  The rankings are developed based on surveys of 
MBA recruiters.  The recruiters are asked to rank twelve school attributes and thirteen student attributes.  The school 
attributes include program cost, placement services, faculty, curriculum, and the historical recruitment success from 
the school.  Student attributes include leadership potential, communication and interpersonal skills, international 
perspective, and visionary thinking.  The complete results are published in a book titled The Wall Street Journal 
Guide to Business Schools.  Summary results are reported in a special edition of the Wall Street Journal.   
 
We examine which schools are the most effective at producing graduates who ultimately become the CEO 
of large firms.  Four hundred sixty three institutions of higher education are represented in the Forbes 800 
Compensation List from 1987-1996.  Four hundred twenty three of the institutions provided an undergraduate 
degree to at least one CEO.    One Hundred eighty two institutions provided a graduate degree to at least one CEO.  
We examine the extent to which each of the schools are represented in the dataset.  For comparison purposes 
management years are aggregated for each university in the sample.  The number of management years performed 
by graduates of each university thereby are counted.  Each university is ranked based on the number of management 
years attributable to the school.  A listing of the number of management years attributable to various institutions of 
higher education is provided in Table 1.  Summary statistics of the top ranking schools are provided in Table 2.   
 
Panel A of Table 1 is a listing of the number of management years attributable to the 50 most effective 
undergraduate schools.  The top undergraduate school, Princeton, produced 241 observations or 3% of all 
management years.  The top 5 undergraduate schools produced 996 management years or 12.5 percent of the total.  
The top ten undergraduate schools combine for a total of 1586 (19.8 percent) observations.  The top 25 schools 
combine for a total of 2,715 observations (33.9 percent).  Finally, the top 50 schools combine 3944 observations or 
49.3 percent of all management years.   
 
Panel B of Table 1 is a listing of the number of management years attributable to various graduate schools.  
Forty-nine percent (3,930 out of 8,000) of the management years were performed by CEOs having a graduate 
degree.  This figure is somewhat higher than those reported by others. Mintzberg and Lampel (2001) report that 
about forty percent of the one hundred largest U.S. corporations are run by individuals that hold a MBA degree.   
That the figures reported here are somewhat higher is not surprising as we count those holding any graduate degree 
rather than only those holding an MBA degree.  Of the 3930 observations having a graduate degree, 3024 
observations received their graduate degree from a different school than they received their undergraduate degree 
from while 906 received their graduate degree from the same school that offered their undergraduate degree.  Thus 
there seems to be a preference to change schools when attending graduate school.  The top graduate school, Harvard 
University, was responsible for the graduate education of a whopping 750 management years, 9.4 percent of all 
CEO’s, and 19.1 percent of those CEOs having a graduate degree!  The total for Harvard is more than the number 2 
through 5 ranked schools combined.  The top five graduate schools were responsible for 1437 management years, 
18.0 percent of all CEO’s and 36.6 percent of CEOs having a graduate degree.   The top ten graduate schools 
combine for a total of 1934 observations, 24.2 percent of all CEO’s and 49.2 percent of those CEOs that have a 
graduate degree.  The top 25 schools combine for 2633 management years, 32.9 percent of all CEO’s, and 67.0 
percent of CEO’s having a graduate degree.   Finally, the top 50 schools combine for 3157 management years or 
39.5 percent of all CEO’s and 80.3 percent of CEOs that have a graduate degree.   
 
College students having both an undergraduate and a graduate degree have two possible paths for 
combining their undergraduate and graduate educations.  One path is to get both their undergraduate and graduate 
degrees from the same institution.  The other path is to change schools, thereby getting an undergraduate degree 
from one institution and a graduate degree from a different institution.  The affiliation with a particular institution is 
thought to be important in becoming a CEO, regardless of the degree level.  In this ranking, the combined 
undergraduate and graduate education of the CEOs are examined.  In order to complete the ranking the number of 
management years attributable to a CEO who received their undergraduate degree, their graduate degree, or both 
degrees from a given institution are counted.  The results are presented in Panel C of Table 1.  Again, Harvard 
dominates the group with 889 observations, thereby being responsible for educating the CEO’s that perform 11.1 
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percent of all management years and 12.1 percent of all degreed CEO management years.  The top 5 schools are 
responsible for 2052 management years, 25.7 percent of all management years and 28.0 percent of those 
management years having a degreed CEO.  The top 10 schools produce 3080 observations, or 38.5 percent of all 
management years and 42.0 percent of management years where the CEO possessed a degree.  The top 25 schools 
are responsible for 4585 management years, 57.3 percent of all management years and 62.5 percent of management 
years where the CEO possessed a degree.  The top 50 schools are responsible for 6125 management years or 76.5 
percent of all management years and 83.5 percent of management years where the CEO possessed a degree.   
 
Table 2 contains a summary of the rankings in Table 1.  The combined evidence clearly suggests that there 
is an elite group of schools from which CEOs of large companies are selected.    The evidence suggests that a 
student with the goal of becoming the CEO of a large corporation has a clear educational path toward increasing the 
probability of achieving that goal.  Most notable is the very large number of CEOs that received their graduate 
education from Harvard University.  As noted earlier, a full 19.1 percent of all CEOs that have a graduate degree, 
received their degree from Harvard University.    
 
 
Table 1:  Educational Background By School 
 
 Panel A:  Undergrad Schools Panel B: Grad. Schools Panel C:  Undergrad and Grad. 
Rank School N School N School N 
 Total Observations 8,000 Total Observations 8,000 Total Obs. 8,000 
 No Undergrad Ed 665 No Graduate Ed 4,070 No UG or No G 665 
1 Princeton 241 Harvard 750 Harvard 889 
2 Yale 220 Stanford 187 Pennsylvania 330 
3 Harvard 206 Pennsylvania 182 Stanford 287 
4 Cornell 169 Columbia 161 Princeton 278 
5 Pennsylvania 160 MIT 157 Yale 268 
6 Michigan 135 Michigan 141 Michigan 218 
7 Stanford 133 NYU 111 Columbia 214 
8 North Carolina 115 Chicago 102 MIT 214 
9 Purdue 108 Northwestern 76 Cornell 196 
10 Northwestern 99 Cornell 67 NYU 186 
11 MIT 98 SMU 59 Northwestern 166 
12 Dartmouth 91 George Washington 56 Chicago 120 
13 Wisconsin 88 Princeton 56 North Carolina 119 
14 NYU 86 Berkeley 53 Purdue 117 
15 Notre Dame 76 Washington 52 Washington 102 
16 Texas 75 Yale 51 Wisconsin 100 
17 Missouri 74 Indiana 50 Virginia 99 
18 Georgia Tech 72 Virginia 47 Berkeley 93 
19 Oklahoma 70 Pittsburgh 46 Dartmouth 93 
20 Vanderbilt 70 Minnesota 41 Illinois 86 
21 Columbia 69 Dartmouth 40 Texas 84 
22 Washington 68 Georgia State 39 Minnesota 83 
23 CUNY City 68 Loyola 38 Pittsburgh 82 
24 Minnesota 63 USC 37 USC 81 
25 Berkeley 61 Purdue 34 Indiana 80 
26 Arkansas 60 Illinois 33 Missouri 80 
27 Illinois 59 Case Western 31 SMU 77 
28 Auburn 58 Boston U 26 Notre Dame 76 
29 Ohio State 58 Houston 25 Georgia Tech 74 
30 Utah 57 Iowa 24 Oklahoma 70 
31 Colorado 56 Wisconsin 24 Vanderbilt 70 
32 Kansas 56 North Carolina 22 CUNY City 68 
33 Davidson 52 Pace 22 Boston U 66 
34 Virginia 52 Cincinnati 22 Ohio State 65 
35 Cincinnati 51 Duke 21 Iowa 64 
36 Navy 51 Georgetown 21 George Washington 63 
37 USC 51 Texas 21 Utah 62 
38 Iowa 50 Rutgers 20 Arkansas 60 
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39 Army 48 Kentucky 19 Auburn 60 
40 Lehigh 47 Seton Hall 19 Colorado 59 
41 Penn State 47 St Louis 19 Kansas 56 
42 Alabama 47 Utah 19 Cincinnati 55 
43 Pittsburgh 46 Arkansas 18 Duke 55 
44 Duke 42 Texas Christian 18 Rutgers 55 
45 North Carolina State 42 Fordham 17 Lehigh 53 
46 Boston U 42 South Carolina 17 Davidson 52 
47 SMU 41 Texas A&M 17 Navy 51 
48 Indiana 40 Boston College 17 Case Western 50 
49 Fordham 38 Oklahoma 16 Loyola 50 
50 Michigan State 38 Univ. of Richmond 16 Depaul 49 
 Florida 38     
 Brown 38     
 Top 50 Total 3,944* Top 50 Total 3157 Top 50 Schools 6,125 
 Other Schools 3,391 Other Schools 773 Other Schools 1,210 
 
* Four Universities tied for the 49th ranking in the undergraduate education listing.  While all four universities are listed, only two 
are used to computing the number of observations attributable to the top 50 schools. 
 
 
Table 2:  Summary of Top School Representation 
 
 Undergrad Graduate Graduate or Undergraduate 
School All CEO’s With degree All CEO’s With Degree All CEO’s With Degree 
Top School 3.0% (241) 3.3 % 9.4 % (750) 19.1 % 11.1 % (889) 12.1 % 
Top 5 School 12.5% (996) 13.6 % 18.0 % (1437) 36.6 % 25.7 (2052) 28.0 % 
Top 10 School 19.8% (1586) 21.6 % 24.2 % (1934) 49.2 % 38.5% (3080) 42.0 % 
Top 25 School 33.9% (2715) 37.0 % 32.9 % (2633) 67.0 % 57.3% (4585) 62.5 % 
Top 50 School 49.3%(3944) 53.8 % 39.5 % (3157) 80.3 % 76.6% (6125) 83.5 % 
 
Observations        8,000 
Received UG Degree        7,335 
Did not receive an UG Degree         665 
Received a Unique Undergraduate School   6,429 
Received a Graduate Degree     3,930 
Did not Receive a Graduate Degree    4,070 
Received a Unique Graduate Degree    3,024 
Attended same Undergraduate and Graduate School    906 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Educational Background and CEO Compensation 
 
We turn to the issue of how the university attended affects the compensation of the CEO.  Two competing 
theories of the relationship between education and future earnings are frequently forwarded.  The human capital 
theory is that the credential of having a degree is not what is important in determining future successes.  Rather, the 
skills learned allow individual to achieve higher employment status.  The screening theory argues that credentials 
afford the individual something above and beyond the skills attained.  That is, individuals can only realize the value 
of the skills they have learned when accompanied by the acquisition of a recognized credential.  Employers, lacking 
complete information about an individual, rely on credentials as a screening device.  Students select an educational 
level that signals their abilities to employers.  This debate has continued for many years.  The general method used 
to distinguish between screening and human capital theories is to decompose the role of education into a skills 
component and an information component.  Studies typically do this by including both degrees earned and number 
of years of education variables into earnings regressions.  (Park, 1999, Gullason, 1999 and Heywood, 1994).  Park 
(1999) estimated the certification value of different levels of education achievement.  An earnings gain of 21 percent 
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was found for obtaining a bachelor’s degree.  Heywood (1994) examined differences in signaling effects across 
public, private unionized, and non-unionized, labor markets.  He found that signaling effects are strongest in private 
sector and nonunion labor markets.  Gullason (1999) examines signaling effects across five age cohorts.  He finds 
that the returns to educational signals have reduced value as additional work experience permits a more direct 
observation of employee quality.  Pascarella and Smart (1990) examine the incomes of individuals nine years after 
they entered college.  They find that university selectivity is a significant explanatory variable in explaining income 
net of the influence of control variables. The extent to which possessing a degree as well as where the degree was 
received from affects the salary the CEO will receives is of critical importance.   
 
Salary data as it relates to the University where the individual received his degree is provided in Table 3.  
To complete this analysis, CEO compensation data is deflated using the Consumer Price Index to 1996 equivalent 
dollars.  A quick look indicates that individuals that reach the position of the CEO of a major corporation make 
considerable more than other individuals.  The Forbes 800 CEO’s average salary is $2,470,829 per year.  In contrast, 
the average salary of MBA graduates from the best schools approaches $100,000, a paltry amount by comparison 
(The Wall Street Journal, 2001).    Interestingly, graduates from Harvard University are not among the highest paid.  
Harvard University did not make the top 50 list of undergraduate schools.  While Harvard did make the top 50 list of 
Graduate Schools, its twenty-first ranking was lower than expected. 
 
We continue the analysis by comparing the salaries of CEOs having varying degree levels and having gone 
to various schools.  In Panel A of Table 4, we compare salaries based on the degree that the CEO earned.  We begin 
by comparing those CEOs that have a College Degree to those CEOs that do not have a college degree.  The results 
are somewhat surprising.  CEOs without a degree are found to earn significantly more than those CEOs that possess 
a college degree.  The data indicates that CEOs without a earned $3,591,581 per year, while those possessing a 
degree earned $2,370,042.  The difference, as compared using a t-test is significant at the 1 percent level.  In 
Column two, we compare those CEOs that have an undergraduate degree, but do not have a graduate degree to those 
CEOs that do not possess a college degree.  Again, the evidence indicates that CEOs without a degree receive higher 
compensation levels.  We continue by comparing those CEOs that have a graduate degree to those CEOs that do not  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Compensation By School 
 
 Panel A:  Undergrad Schools Panel B: Grad. Schools Panel C:  Undergrad and Grad. 
Rank School Comp. School Comp. School Comp. 
 Total Observations 7,878 Total Observations 7,878 Total Observations 7,878 
 No Undergrad Ed 3,591581 No Graduate Ed 2,487,153 No UG or No G 3,591,581 
1 Denison 16,710,483 Tulane 6,810,648 Denison 16,710,483 
2 Colgate 6,061,394 Boston 6,693,061 SUNY Buffalo 8,229,066 
3 CUNY City Col 5,710,012 New York Law 5,008,924 Colgate 6,061,395 
4 Washburn 5,293,872 Illinois 4,850,252 CUNY City 5,710,012 
5 Massachusetts 5,249,740 USC 4,131,387 Washburn 5,293,872 
6 CUNY Brooklyn C 4,734,296 Washington 3,992,146 New York Law 4,998,513 
7 West Virginia 4,377,439 SMU 3,776,054 Tulane 4,768,100 
8 Chicago 4,373,702 Berkeley 3,724,143 CUNY Brooklyn 4,734,296 
9 Dickinson 4,231,995 Houston 3,388,187 Massachusetts 4,672,861 
10 Houston 4,140,717 Princeton 3,291,316 Boston U 4,569,346 
11 Cornell 4,045,774 St. Louis 3,192,409 Dickinson C 4,231,995 
12 Fairleigh Dickinson 3,958,745 Yale 3,115,882 West Virginia 4,101,957 
13 Syracuse 3,890,552 Carnegie Mellon 3,047,966 Tufts 3,971,864 
14 Georgia State 3,866,856 Seton Hall 2,910,332 Syracuse 3,890,552 
15 Miami 3,857,435 Missouri 2,830,593 Illinois 3,811,684 
16 American U Beirut 3,789,125 Pennsylvania 2,796,890 Redlands 3,787,759 
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17 St. John’s 3,665,909 Dartmouth 2,794,163 Houston 3,787,218 
18 Brown 3,623,424 Indiana 2,782,489 Cornell 3,783,614 
19 Vanderbilt 3,553,493 Rollins 2,590,742 Queens U 3,767,379 
20 Kent State 3,549,909 Cornell 2,582,507 Brown 3,671,498 
21 Georgia 3,458,758 Harvard 2,580,568 Vanderbilt 3,553,494 
22 CUNY Queens 3,383,593 Oklahoma 2,551,225 Kent State 3,549,909 
23 Haverford 3,336,479 Georgia State 2,493,012 CUNY Queens 3,383,593 
24 Antioch 3,186,679 Purdue 2,468,333 Haverford 3,336,479 
25 Boston U 3,128,826 Chicago 2,393,145 Fairleigh Dickinson 3,316,366 
26 USC 3,114,113 Minnesota 2,335,246 Miami 3,251,298 
27 Worchester 3,100,913 Texas A&M 2,278,089 Louisville 3,196,395 
28 Pennsylvania 3,063,343 Stanford 2,276,194 USC 3,192,105 
29 Williams C 3,054,325 MIT 2,204,035 Antioch 3,186,680 
30 Illinois 3,028,380 Michigan 2,200,978 Seton Hall 3,170,615 
31 Army 2,937,201 Rutgers 2,187,836 SMU 3,135,649 
32 Texas Tech 2,928,969 Columbia 2,160,335 American U Beirut 3,128,034 
33 Northwestern 2,884,947 Georgia Tech 2,112,751 Berkeley 3,121,657 
34 Lehigh 2,840,935 Pittsburgh 2,103,258 Worcester 3,100,914 
35 Yale 2,798,557 Northwestern 2,071,845 Georgia 3,095,266 
36 Rhode Island 2,750,080 NYU 2,054,161 Williams C 3,054,326 
37 Babson 2,743,002 Pace 2,018,599 Pennsylvania 2,980,738 
38 Wabash 2,718,643 Boston C 1,987,602 St Louis 2,949,938 
39 Missouri 2,710,495 Virginia 1,955,572 Army 2,937,201 
40 NYU 2,677,226 George Washington 1,918,598 Texas Tech 2,928,969 
41 Johns Hopkins 2,668,256 Pepperdine 1,871,938 Yale 2,870,374 
42 Carleton 2,659,735 Villanova 1,857,230 Arizona State 2,775,240 
43 Stanford 2,619,089 Kentucky 1,826,198 Johns Hopkins 2,725,559 
44 Texas 2,601,941 Case Western 1,822,180 Wabash 2,718,643 
45 Princeton 2,595,644 Wisconsin Milwaukee 1,812,049 Washington 2,714,901 
46 Northeastern 2,582,320 South Carolina 1,788,327 Chicago 2,700,473 
47 Louisiana Tech 2,570,991 Fordham 1,782,019 St Johns 2,683,116 
48 Wake Forest 2,555,943 DePaul 1,724,440 Princeton 2,678,904 
49 Wooster 2,552,973 Utah 1,641,957 Carleton 2,659,735 
50 Dartmouth 2,543,570 Maryland 1,608,955 Missouri 2,659,388 
 Average Comp. 2,470,829     
 
 
 
have a graduate degree (Column 3).  No difference is found between the salaries of these two groups.  When we 
eliminate those CEOs that do not have a degree from the sample (Column 4), there remains no evidence of a salary 
differential.  Finally, we compare those CEO’s that have a graduate degree to those CEOs that do not have a college 
degree (Column 5).  Again, those CEOs who do not have a college degree continue to produce higher salaries.  
These findings are certainly surprising on their face.  However, it is possible that the findings might be explained by 
confounding factors.  One such potentially confounding factor is the possibility that there is a preponderance of 
CEOs that are firm founders among the non-degree group.  This issue is explored later in the paper.  As second 
potentially confounding factor is the possibility that CEOs who are family members of major shareholders are 
represented more heavily in the non-degreed group.  Unfortunately, the data does not contain information 
concerning CEO family background. 
 
We continue by comparing the compensation by the school that the CEO attended.  The results are 
presented in Table 4, Panel B.  In the Combined Schools analysis, those CEO’s that did not receive a degree are 
eliminated from the sample.  We group schools by their rank in CEO production as outlined in Table 1.  For 
example, the Big 5 undergraduate schools are the five undergraduate schools that produced the largest number of 
CEOs.  We find some evidence that the school that the CEO attended affects the salary that the CEO will receive.  
Specifically, when comparing the BIG 5 schools versus all other schools, the BIG 10 Schools versus all other 
schools and the Big 25 schools versus all other schools, CEO’s attending the high ranked schools receive a higher 
compensation than CEOs that attend other institutions.  To examine undergraduate degrees, those CEOs not having 
a degree are eliminated from the analysis as well as those CEOs that have a graduate degree.  Again, the data 
indicates that those CEOs that attend the BIG universities receive different compensation than others.  Interestingly, 
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those CEOs that attended the number one school received lower compensation than CEOs from other schools.  
CEOs that attended a BIG 5 or BIG 10 School received higher compensation than other CEO’s.  Finally, we 
examine Graduate Degrees.  For this analysis, we eliminate any CEO that does not have a graduate degree from the 
analysis.  We find no evidence to suggest that the graduate school attended affects the salary of the CEO will 
receive. 
 
Table 4:  Comparison Of Total Compensation By Degree And School Rank 
Panel A 
 With Degree 
Without degree 
Undergrad 
Degree 
Without Degree 
Graduate Degree 
No Grad Degree 
Graduate degree 
Undergrad 
Degree only 
Graduate Degree 
No Degree 
With Degree 
Without Degree 
Nw/Nwo 
T-Statistic 
2,370,042 
3,591,581 
7228 (650) 
-3.10*** 
2,273,053 
3,591,581 
3353 (650) 
3.29*** 
2487153 
2453996 
3875 (4003) 
0.26 
2,453,966 
2,273,053 
3875 (3353) 
1.46 
2,453,966 
3,591,581 
3875 (650) 
2.86*** 
Panel B 
Big Schools Combined Big 1 Big 5 Big 10 Big 25 Big 50 
Big School CEO’s 
All Other CEO’s 
Nbig/Nother 
T Statistic 
2,500,381 
2,352,161 
872 (6356) 
-1.10 
2,584,263 
2,299,214 
1796 (5432) 
-2.40** 
2,543,657 
2,272,154 
2606 (4622) 
-2.25** 
2,503,229 
2,218,751 
3844 (3384) 
-2.30** 
2,431,214 
2,247,063 
4827 (2401) 
-1.33 
 
Big Schools Undergraduate Big 1 Big 5 Big 10 Big 25 Big 50 
Big School 
All Other CEO’s 
Nbig/Nother 
T Statistic 
1,691,659 
2,290,190 
96 (3257) 
3.33*** 
3,139,288 
2,145,282 
431 (2922) 
-2.69*** 
2,780,568 
2,142,511 
686 (2667) 
-2.34** 
2,509,675 
2,158,461 
1094 (2259) 
-1.71 
2,322,489 
2,222,272 
1699 (1654) 
-0.52 
 
Big Schools Graduate Big 1 Big 5 Big 10 Big 25 Big 50 
Big School 
All Other CEO’s 
Nbig/Nother 
T Statistic 
2,580,568 
2,424,332 
735 (3140) 
-0.96 
2,480,268 
2,438,888 
1412 (2463) 
-0.29 
2,430,388 
2,472,746 
1718 (2157) 
0.28 
2,555,433 
2,287,414 
2408 (1467) 
1.63 
2,481,978 
2,383,836 
2769 (1106) 
-0.52 
For this analysis, CEO’s whose educational background are not known are deleted from the analysis.   
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.   
To analyze the compensation issue further, we use the full Forbes 800 Compensation data, as reduced when 
merged with the Compustat data.  Of interest is to determine how the dependent variable, the Total Compensation of 
the CEO, is related to the following independent variables.  The first independent variable is UGATT, a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 when the CEO earned an undergraduate degree and 0 when the CEO did not earn an 
undergraduate degree.  Those CEOs having earned an undergraduate degree are expected to command higher total 
compensation than those CEO’s that have not earned an undergraduate degree.  The variable GATT is the graduate 
school equivalent of UGATT.  The variable YRCEO is the number of years that the individual has been the CEO of 
the firm.  A positive relationship between total compensation and the number of years an individual has been the 
CEO of a firm is expected because of annual compensation reviews.  The variable YRFRM is the number of years 
the CEO has been with the same firm.  The variable CEOAGE is the current age of the CEO.  It is hypothesized that 
older CEOs will command higher salaries than their younger counterparts due to experience.  A positive relationship 
between the years an individual has been with the firm and their compensation as the CEO is expected due to the 
value of institutional experience. CEOs who have been with the firm for a longer period of time possess institutional 
knowledge that is valuable in their role as the CEO.  The final independent variable, FOUNDER, is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 when the CEO is the founder of the firm and 0 when the CEO is not the founder of the firm.  
CEOs who are the Founder of the Firm are though to be in a better negotiating position than other CEOs, as such 
they will command higher compensation.  Finally, we measure the natural log the firms ASSETS to control for 
skewness in the data.  It is expected that CEOs of larger firms will earn higher salaries due to a higher level of 
responsibility and the ability of the firm to pay.  We include a series of dummy variables in each regression to 
control for differences by industry.  The dummy variables are developed based on SIC codes as taken from 
Compustat data.  Nine dummy variables are created based on the SIC code deciles.  The coefficients of the dummy 
variables are not meaningful and as such are not reported.  In general however, the dummy variables were 
significant.  
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The regression results are presented in Table 5.  Regressions are run incorporating each of the independent 
variables individually.  Four of the independent variables, UGATT, UGCODE, YRCEO, CEOAGE, FOUNDER and 
ASSETS are significant in explaining variations in total CEO compensation.  Several additional noteworthy 
observations can be made from these regressions.    Most interesting is that CEO’s that have an undergraduate 
degree receive $1,121,636 less compensation per year than CEOs that do not have an undergraduate degree.   The 
significance of the variable YRCEO provides evidence that the number of years that the individual has been the 
CEO of the firm is an important determinant of salary.  The coefficient indicates that the salary of the CEO increases 
by $68,232 for each year that the individual serves as the CEO of the firm.  CEO age is also a significant 
explanatory variable.  The coefficient indicates that each year of additional age results in a $31,836 higher salary.  
Interestingly, in the multiple regressions,  the number of years that an individual has been with the firm has a 
negative impact on his/her earnings.  This suggests that the salary compression that is so well known in academic 
institutions is also present in the highest levels of the corporate world.  FOUNDER is found to be significant in 
explaining the compensation of the CEO.  The coefficient on the FOUNDER variable indicates that Founders 
receive $1,335,576 more in total compensation per year than other CEOs.  Similarly, the coefficient on the ASSETS 
variable indicates that CEOs from large firms earn more than other CEOs.    Equally interesting is those variables 
that were not significant in the single regressions.  GATT, the dummy variable for having attended graduate school 
is not significant, suggesting that possessing a graduate degree is not an important factor in determining CEO 
compensation.  Finally, the number of years that a CEO has been with the firm is not important in determining the 
total compensation as CEO.  We combine the variables into a multiple regression with similar results.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Regressions on Total Compensation. 
 
Constant UGATT GATT YRCEO YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER ASSETS R2/Fstat 
2,903,464 
6392 
-1,121,636 
-4.14*** 
      0..0174 
14.14*** 
1,836,692 
6392 
 108,156 
0.72 
     0.0148 
12.03*** 
1,463,704 
6392 
  68,232 
7.28*** 
    0.0229 
18.69*** 
1,915,854 
6390 
   -1,261.11 
-0.20 
   0.0148 
12.00*** 
21,832 
6392 
    31,836 
2.93*** 
  0.0161 
13.05*** 
1,866,469 
6369 
     1,335,576 
5.15*** 
 0.0189 
15.34*** 
-13,057,515 
6392 
      689,351 
10.74*** 
0.0322 
26.59*** 
-16,219,239 
6367 
-1,216,554 
-4.33*** 
48,952 
0.31 
83.813 
7.04*** 
-39,981 
-5.53*** 
2,751.06 
0.22 
897,052 
3.10*** 
889,444 
13.24*** 
0.0535 
25.63 
-16,131,592 
6367 
-1,119,852 
-4.39*** 
 84,795 
7.55*** 
-39,974 
-5.89*** 
 886,875 
3.09*** 
892,904 
13.43*** 
0.0534 
29.90*** 
 
The dependent variable is the Total CEO compensation.  The number of observations are in italics.  The T-statistic is in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.   
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
 
We continue the analysis by examining how the classification of the school attended affects the salary 
received.  The results are presented in Table 6.  The evidence suggest that there is no difference in salary depending 
upon the class of school attended.  Each of the class variables are insignificant after controlling for the effects of the 
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control variables.  The results hold for the combined sample (Panel A), the undergraduate sample (Panel B), and the 
graduate sample (Panel C).  Each of the control variables, with the exception of Founder, is significant in at least one 
sample. 
 
3.3  Educational Effectiveness 
 
We continue by examining the effectiveness of CEOs based on their educational background.  We measure 
the effectiveness of the CEO as the ability to produce return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.  Tobin’s Q measures 
the market value of the firm relative to the assets that the firm employees.  While other measures of performance 
could be included, we limit ourselves to these variables in the current research.  For this analysis we create two 
additional control variables.  The first additional control variable is the debt ratio (Total Debt divided by Total 
Assets).  It is well known that the capital structure that the firm adopts affects the firm in various ways including 
through financial leverage effects. The second additional independent variable is growth in sales.  To the extent that 
CEO’s are able to produce sales growth, his/her compensation is expected to increase.  In Table 7, the school 
attendance variables are included in the analysis.  In Table 8, the BIG variables as previously described are included 
in the analysis.  In both cases, while not reported in the table, the industry dummy variables were included in the 
analysis. 
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Table 6:  Regressions on Total Compensation 
 
Panel A:  Combined Sample 
Constant/N Big1 BIG5 BIG10 BIG25 BIG50 Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER ASSET
S 
R2/Fstat 
-15,788,705 
5841 
75,595 
0.36 
    79,178 
6.75*** 
-33,630 
-4.94*** 
1255.27 
0.10 
386,381 
1.34 
825,029 
13.13*** 
0.0568 
26.97*** 
-15,845,575 
5841 
 206,282 
1.28 
   77,427 
6.55*** 
-33,377 
-4.92*** 
1818.20 
0.14 
389,011 
1.35 
824,018 
13.12*** 
0.0570 
27.10*** 
-15,801,064 
5841 
  -157,490 
-1.07 
  81,609 
6.87*** 
-34,408 
-5.07*** 
884.83 
0.07 
382,180 
1.33 
829,758 
13.19*** 
0.0569 
27.06*** 
-15,774,897 
5841 
   23,932 
0.17 
 79.195 
6.70*** 
-33,788 
-4.98*** 
1012.55 
0.08 
382,402 
1.33 
825,266 
13.14*** 
0.0567 
26.96*** 
-15,735,892 
5841 
    -60,424 
-0.41 
80,034 
6.79*** 
-33,969 
-5.01*** 
1003.78 
0.08 
377,286 
1.31 
825,632 
13.14 
0.0568 
26.98*** 
            
Panel B:  Undergraduate Sample 
Constant/N Big1u BIG5u BIG10u BIG25u BIG50u Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER ASSETS R2 
-17,094,524 
2769 
-415,509 
-0.69 
    89,986 
5.52*** 
-33,247 
-3.34*** 
-29,423 
-1.63 
472,759 
1.18 
960,091 
9.82*** 
0.0702 
16.01*** 
-17,147,921 
2769 
 223,400 
0.72 
   87,911 
5.35*** 
-33,714 
-3.38*** 
-29,011 
-1.61 
482,251 
1.20 
960,956 
9.83*** 
0.0702 
16.01*** 
-17,178,529 
2769 
  121,882 
0.47 
  88,315 
5.36*** 
-33,791 
-3.37*** 
-29,112 
-1.62 
472,328 
1.18 
962,991 
9.86*** 
0.0701 
15.99*** 
-17,174,681 
2769 
   17,010 
0.08 
 89,255 
5.41*** 
-33,325 
-3.33*** 
-29,460 
-1.63 
473,235 
1.18 
963,228 
9.86*** 
0.0701 
15.97*** 
-17,053,124 
2769 
    -163,343 
-0.79 
91,228 
5.55*** 
-32,511 
-3.25 
-29,445 
-1.63 
457,470 
1.14 
960,131 
9.82*** 
0.0703 
16.02*** 
            
Panel C:  Graduate Sample 
Constant/N Big1g BIG5g BIG10g BIG25g BIG50g Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER ASSET
S 
R2 
-14,650,804 
3071 
102,490 
0.43 
    71,213 
4.11*** 
-36,415 
-3.72*** 
39,483 
2.19** 
69,838 
0.16 
680,371 
8.07*** 
0.0518 
12.86*** 
-14,510,116 
3071 
 -125,325 
-0.63 
   72,976 
4.20*** 
-36,953 
-3.77*** 
39,219 
2.18** 
59,572 
0.14 
678,634 
8.06*** 
0.0519 
12.88*** 
-14,491,781 
3071 
  -283,450 
-1.46 
  75,561 
4.33*** 
-37,022 
-3.78*** 
38,640 
2.14** 
55,078 
0.13 
682,266 
8.10*** 
0.0524 
13.02*** 
-14,549,872 
3071 
   -159,192 
-0.79 
 73,005 
4.21*** 
-36,510 
-3.73*** 
38,912 
2.16** 
56,817 
0.13 
682,555 
8.09*** 
0.0520 
12.89*** 
14,479,685 
3071 
    -159110 
-0.75 
72,433 
4.19*** 
-36,352 
-3.72*** 
38,737 
2.15** 
52,283 
0.12 
679,895 
8.07 
0.0519 
12.89*** 
The dependent variable is the Total CEO compensation.  The number of observations are in italics.  The T-statistic is in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.   
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
In Table 7, the results indicate that having received an undergraduate degree and having received a 
graduate degree are important in explaining the ROA of the firm.  However, the coefficients are negative indicating 
that those CEOs that do not have a degree outperform those CEOs that do have a degree.  This may not be surprising 
in light of evidence provided by Mintzberg and Lampel (2001) who note a preponderance of business failures 
among firms managed by CEOs having an MBA degree.  This evidence is also consistent with the finding that 
CEO’s without a degree earn more than those with a degree.  However, in the multiple regression, UGATT and 
GATT are no longer significant in explaining ROA after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables.  
Consistent with most literature, we find a negative size effect, with large firms earning a lower return than small 
firms.  In the single regression, there is no evidence of a capital structure effect, however, the debt ratio variable is 
significant in the multiple regression.  Finally, we find that firm founders produce a higher return on assets than 
other CEOs.  Thus the higher salaries associated with firm founders noted earlier appear to be appropriate given the 
higher returns earned by these CEOs. 
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Table 7: Regressions on ROA. 
 
Constant ugatt gatt Yrceo YRfrm ceoage Founder DR Assets growth R2/Fstat 
0.04769 
6381 
-0.0971 
-3.60*** 
        0.1627 
154.82*** 
0.0411 
6381 
 -0.0044 
-3.00*** 
       0.1622 
154.23*** 
0.0348 
6381 
  0.0007 
7.21*** 
      0.1678 
160.63*** 
0.0354 
6379 
   0.00018 
2.96*** 
     0.1622 
154.22*** 
0.0393 
6381 
    -0.000006 
-0.06 
    0.1610 
152.88*** 
0.0384 
6358 
     0.0240 
9.56*** 
   0.1751 
168.48*** 
0.0389 
6380 
      <0.00000001 
0.55 
  0.1611 
152.90*** 
0.2645 
6381 
       -0.0104 
-16.70*** 
 0.1962 
194.41*** 
0.0359 
5941 
        0.0216 
6.72*** 
0.1712 
153.23*** 
0.2576 
5917 
-0.0030 
-1.09 
-0.00107 
0.70 
0.00013 
1.08 
0.00039 
5.54*** 
-0.00033 
-2.65*** 
0.01386 
4.70*** 
<0.00000001 
2.45*** 
-0.0096 
-14.46 
0.01546 
4.82*** 
0.2139 
100.53*** 
 
The dependent variable is Return on Assets.  The number of observations are in italics.  The T-statistic is in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.   
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.   
 
In Table 8, Panel A the results of the test on the Big combined schools are presented.  In Panel B, the 
results of the test on the Big Combined undergraduate schools are presented.  Finally, in Panel C, the results of the 
test on the Big undergraduate schools are presented.  There is limited evidence of a difference in ROA in the 
combined and undergraduate analysis.  However, there is evidence to suggest that those CEOs that attend one of the  
Big graduate schools provide higher ROA than other CEOs.  With the exception of the debt ratio, in general, the 
control statistics are significant in explaining ROA. 
 
In Tables 9 and 10, the regressions on Tobin’s Q are presented.  Like the ROA analysis, Table 9 includes 
the attendance variables while Table 10 includes the Big school variables.  In Table 9, the single regressions indicate 
that each of the explanatory variables with the exception of CEO age are important explanatory variables of Tobin’s 
Q.  The school attendance variables are positively related to Tobin’s Q being significant at the 1 percent level.  
Interestingly, the YRCEO, YRFRM, CEO age and Founder variables each have negative coefficients.  In Table 10, 
the results suggest some difference in Tobin’s Q based on the school attended.  However, the coefficients are 
generally negative suggesting that graduates from schools that place many graduates in CEO positions are less 
effective at producing high levels of Tobin’s Q than other CEOs. 
 
Section 4:  Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper the educational background of the Chief Executive officers of the largest U.S. firms are 
examined.  The data for the analysis are obtained from the Forbes 800 Compensation list published by Forbes 
Magazine and is supplemented by data from the Compustat data files.  The number of CEOs that have received a 
higher education degree relative to those that have not earned a degree are analyzed.  We find that a large proportion 
of CEOs have an undergraduate degree while a much smaller percentage of the CEOs have a graduate degree.  The 
analysis  proceeds by  investigating the  effectiveness of schools at producing  graduates that achieve  the position of 
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Table 8: Regressions on ROA 
 
 
Panel A:  Combined Sample 
Constant Big1 BIG5 BIG10 BIG25 BIG50 Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER DR ASSETS Growth R2/Fstat 
0.2409 
5470 
0.0022 
1.01 
    0.00026 
2.09** 
0.00032 
4.49*** 
-0.00023 
-1.67* 
0.0121 
3.77*** 
<0.000000001 
0.20 
-0.0092 
-13.61 
0.011 
3.47*** 
0.2072 
95.03 
0.2411 
5470 
 0.0014 
0.81 
   0.00026 
2.04** 
0.00032 
4.45*** 
-0.00023 
-1.69* 
0.0120 
3.74*** 
<0.000000001 
0.20 
-0.0092 
13.61*** 
0.0112 
3.44*** 
0.2071 
95.00*** 
0.2418 
5470 
  0.0010 
.63 
  0.00026 
2.04** 
0.00032 
4.45*** 
-0.00024 
-1.74* 
0.01196 
3.72*** 
<0.000000001 
0.20 
-0.0092 
-13.60*** 
0.01125 
3.46*** 
0.2071 
94.97*** 
0.2413 
5470 
   0.00073 
0.49 
 0.00026 
2.08** 
0.00032 
4.43*** 
-0.00023 
-1.73* 
0.012 
3.74*** 
<0.000000001 
0.20 
-0.0092 
-13.60*** 
0.01127 
3.47*** 
0.2071 
94.96*** 
0.2422 
5470 
    -0.0014 
-0.92 
0.00029 
2.27** 
0.00031 
4.37*** 
-0.00024 
-1.73* 
0.01187 
3.69*** 
<0.000000001 
0.20 
-0.0092 
13.59*** 
0.01135 
3.49*** 
0.2071 
95.01*** 
              
Panel B: Undergraduate Sample 
Constant Big1u BIG5u BIG10u BIG25u BIG50u Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER DR ASSETS Growth R2 
0.3126 
2579 
-0.008 
-1.18 
    -0.00009 
-0.48 
0.00072 
6.45*** 
-0.00047 
-2.25*** 
0.0095 
2.00** 
<0.000000001 
0.32 
-0.01251 
-11.29*** 
0.0316 
5.22*** 
0.2305 
51.21 
0.3112 
2579 
 0.0037 
1.08 
   -0.00013 
-0.69 
0.00071 
6.32*** 
-0.00045 
-2.17** 
0.0096 
2.02** 
<0.000000001 
0.32 
-0.0125 
-11.27*** 
0.0304 
5.17*** 
0.2305 
51.19*** 
0.3104 
2579 
  0.00052 
0.18 
  -0.00011 
--0.57 
0.00071 
6.35*** 
-0.00046 
-2.21*** 
0.0094 
1.98** 
<0.000000001 
0.32 
-0.0125 
-11.24*** 
0.0315 
5.19*** 
0.2301 
51.09 
0.3104 
2579 
   -0.0064 
-2.55 
 -0.00002 
-0.12 
0.00074 
6.65*** 
-0.00045 
-2.16** 
0.0088 
1.85* 
<0.000000001 
0.34 
-0.0125 
-11.27*** 
0.0319 
5.27*** 
0.2321 
51.66*** 
0.3176 
2579 
    -0.0092 
-3.97*** 
0.000001 
0.01 
0.00076 
6.79*** 
-0.00047 
-2.25** 
0.00864 
1.83* 
<0.000000001 
0.35 
-0.0126 
-11.43 
0.0316 
5.23*** 
0.2348 
52.46*** 
              
Panel C:  Graduate Sample 
Constant Big1g BIG5g BIG10g BIG25g BIG50g Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER DR ASSETS Growth R2 
0.1975 
2890 
0.0029 
1.24 
    0.00046 
2.70*** 
0.000008 
0.08 
0.00016 
0.90 
0.0122 
2.75*** 
<0.000000001 
1.12 
-0.0078 
-9.24*** 
0.0033 
0.90 
0.2168 
53.07*** 
0.1989 
2890 
 0.0023 
1.18 
   0.00046 
2.69*** 
0.000012 
0.12 
0.000154 
0.86 
0.0116 
2.64*** 
<0.000000001 
1.11 
-0.0078 
-9.32*** 
0.0033 
0.90 
0.2168 
53.05*** 
0.1988 
2890 
  0.00414 
2.18** 
  0.00042 
2.48** 
0.000012 
0.12 
0.00016 
0.91 
0.01176 
2.67*** 
<0.000000001 
1.08 
-0.0079 
-9.38*** 
0.0034 
0.92 
0.2177 
53.34*** 
0.1990 
2890 
   0.0070 
3.55*** 
 0.000425 
2.50** 
0.000001 
0.02 
0.00017 
0.96 
0.01174 
2.67*** 
<0.000000001 
1.02 
-0.00801 
-9.52*** 
0.0032 
0.89 
0.2198 
54.01 
0.1979 
2890 
    0.0038 
1.80* 
0.00046 
2.72*** 
-0.0000009 
-0.01 
0.00016 
0.92 
0.0119 
2.69*** 
<0.000000001 
1.09 
-0.00787 
-9.35*** 
0.0031 
0.88 
0.2173 
53.21*** 
 
The dependent variable is Return on Assets.  The number of observations are in italics.  The T-statistic is in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.   
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.   
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                             Volume 1, Number 1 
 96 
CEO.  For comparison purposes, the data is aggregated for each of the 463 institutes of higher education represented 
in the sample.  Three lists of university effectiveness are created.  The first list indicates the most successful 
undergraduate schools.  The second listing identifies the most popular graduate schools.  The third list identifies the 
most effective universities based on their combined undergraduate and graduate ranking.  A high concentration of 
management years among a relatively small number of schools is evident in the data.  Particularly noteworthy is the 
record of Harvard University.  Over 19 percent of those CEOs that have a graduate degree earned that degree from 
Harvard University!  The effect that degree source has on the total compensation of the CEO is explored.  The data 
indicates that those CEOs which possess an undergraduate degree receive less total compensation per year than 
those CEOs that do not possess an undergraduate degree.  Several explanations are provided for this phenomenon.  
The data suggests that the school attended has no significant effect on the CEO’s compensation.  Overall, the 
evidence suggests that possessing a degree and where the degree is earned is important in reaching the CEO position 
in a firm but has little affect on the salary earned once there.  Other variables found to be significant in explaining 
total CEO compensation are the number of years the CEO has been with the firm, the number of years the CEO has 
served in the CEO capacity, if the CEO is the Founder of the firm, the size of the firm and the industry that the firm 
operates in.  Evidence is found to indicate that those CEO’s that earn a degree, as well as the university attended 
have explanatory power for the firms ROA and Tobin’s Q.   
 
 
 
Table 9: Regressions on Tobins Q. 
 
Constant Ugatt gatt Yrceo YRfrm ceoage Founder DR Assets growth R2/Fstat 
0.6208 
6337 
0.03750 
4.31*** 
        0.3308 
391.04*** 
0.6457 
6337 
 0.01802 
3.82*** 
       0.3304 
390.30*** 
0.6734 
6337 
  -0.0030 
-10.20*** 
      0.3397 
406.96*** 
0.6692 
6335 
   -0.00072 
-3.73*** 
     0.3305 
390.43*** 
0.6784 
6337 
    -0.0004 
-1.18 
    0.3290 
387.84*** 
0.6552 
6316 
     -0.09477 
-11.72*** 
   0.3439 
413.35*** 
0.6538 
6337 
      0.00000001 
7.14*** 
  0.3342 
397.08*** 
-0.5873 
6337 
       0.05725 
29.28*** 
 0.4089 
547.29*** 
0.6531 
5089 
        -0.000003 
-2.05** 
0.4085 
438.54*** 
-0.5382 
5082 
0.0144 
1.80* 
0.00486 
1.13*** 
0.00012 
0.36 
-0.0011 
-5.58*** 
-0.00031 
-0.84 
0.00023 
0.02 
0.00000002 
13.10*** 
0.0557 
29.40*** 
-0.000003 
-2.28** 
0.5286 
355.02 
 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q.  The number of observations are in italics.  The T-statistic is in parentheses.   
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.   
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 10: Regressions on Tobin’s Q 
 
Panel A:  Combined Sample 
Constant Big1 BIG5 BIG10 BIG25 BIG50 Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER DR ASSETS Growth R2/Fstat 
-0.4932 
4707 
-0.010 
-1.63 
    -0.00007 
-0.20 
-0.0011 
-5.65*** 
-0.00004 
-0.11 
-0.011 
-1.00 
0.00000002 
10.77*** 
0.0534 
28.30*** 
-0.000003 
-2.43** 
0.5319 
355.42*** 
-0.4921 
4707 
 -0.4921 
-10.89 
   0.000011 
0.03 
-0.0011 
-5.65*** 
-0.00005 
-0.13 
-0.0102 
-0.96 
0.00000002 
10.73*** 
0.0534 
28.34*** 
-0.000003 
-2.41** 
0.5324 
356.10*** 
-0.4993 
4707 
  -0.01355 
-3.18*** 
  0.00004 
0.11 
-0.0011 
-5.71*** 
0.000008 
0.00 
-0.00919 
-0.86 
0.00000002 
10.72*** 
0.0536 
28.43*** 
-0.000003 
-2.40** 
0.5326 
356.48*** 
-0.4932 
4707 
   -0.0082 
-2.01** 
 -0.00002 
-0.06 
-0.0011 
-5.65*** 
-0.000025 
-0.06 
-0.01005 
-0.94 
0.00000002 
10.72*** 
0.05338 
28.32*** 
-0.000003 
-2.46*** 
0..5320 
355.61*** 
-0.4978 
4707 
    0.0033 
0.87 
-0.00015 
-0.44 
-0.0011 
-5.46*** 
-0.000005 
-0.01 
-0.0096 
-0.90 
0.00000002 
10.78*** 
0.05328 
28.26*** 
-0.000003 
-2.43** 
0.5317 
355.15*** 
              
Panel B:  Undergraduate Sample 
Constant Big1u BIG5u BIG10u BIG25u BIG50u Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER DR ASSETS Growth R2 
-0.6341 
2243 
-0.0062 
-0.37 
    -0.00037 
-0.78 
-0.0019 
-6.42*** 
0.0018 
3.15*** 
0.0091 
0.64 
0.00000002 
8.45*** 
0.0554 
19.76*** 
0.0108 
11.55*** 
0.5637 
191.91*** 
-0.0217 
2243 
 -0.0217 
-2.48** 
   -0.00023 
-0.49 
-0.0018 
-6.21*** 
0.0017 
2.99*** 
0.0102 
0.72 
0.00000002 
8.44*** 
0.0557 
19.92*** 
0.0107 
11.53*** 
0.5649 
192.84*** 
-0.6346 
2243 
  -0.01631 
-2.21** 
  -0.00023 
-0.47 
-0.0018 
-6.10 
0.0017 
3.06*** 
0.0100 
0.70 
0.00000002 
8.42*** 
0.05542 
19.84*** 
0.0107 
11.51*** 
0.5646 
192.64*** 
-0.6364 
2243 
   -0.00602 
-0.94 
 -0.000312 
-0.65 
-0.00187 
-6.30*** 
0.0018 
3.20*** 
0.00853 
0.60 
0.00000002 
8.44*** 
0.0554 
19.81*** 
0.0107 
11.51*** 
0.5639 
192.03*** 
-0.6465 
2243 
    -0.00053 
-1.10 
-0.00053 
-1.10 
-0.00196 
-6.63*** 
0.00182 
3.21*** 
0.00973 
0.68 
0.00000002 
8.49*** 
0.05567 
19.92*** 
0.01076 
11.56*** 
0.5647 
192.69*** 
              
Panel C:  Graduate Sample 
Constant Big1g BIG5g BIG10g BIG25g BIG50g Yrceo YRFRM CEOAGE FOUNDER DR ASSETS Growth R2 
-0.3229 
2463 
-0.01853 
-2.77*** 
    -0.000291 
-0.58 
-0.00029 
-0.58 
-0.00191 
-3.63*** 
-0.0396 
-2.41** 
0.00000002 
6.35*** 
0.05036 
19.82*** 
-0.000003 
-2.54** 
0.5347 
187.56*** 
-0.3372 
2463 
 -0.00668 
-1.23 
   -0.000387 
-0.77 
-0.000214 
-0.81 
-0.00184 
-3.49*** 
-0.0364 
-2.22** 
-0.0000002 
6.27*** 
0.05076 
19.99*** 
-0.000003 
-2.55** 
0.5336 
186.68*** 
-0.3353 
2463 
  -0.01516 
-2.80*** 
  -0.00025 
-0.49 
-0.00022 
-0.82 
-0.00187 
-3.55*** 
-0.03729 
-2.28** 
0.00000002 
6.25*** 
0.05089 
20.07*** 
-0.000003 
-2.51** 
0.5348 
187.58*** 
-0.3352 
2463 
   -0.0144 
-2.55** 
 -0.00034 
-0.68 
-0.00018 
-0.68 
-0.00191 
-3.62*** 
-0.03644 
-2.22** 
0.00000002 
6.22*** 
0.05105 
20.11*** 
-0.000003 
-2.50** 
0..5345 
187.40*** 
-0.3351 
2463 
    -0.0916 
-1.52 
-0.00041 
-0.80 
-0.00018 
-0.69 
-0.0019 
-3.59*** 
-0.0368 
-2.24*** 
0.00000002 
6.22*** 
0.0509 
20.04*** 
-0.000003 
-2.52** 
0.5337 
186.80*** 
 
The dependent variable is Tobins Q.  The number of observations are in italics.  The T-statistic is in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.   
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.   
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